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Introduction 
Nearly four decades have passed since the Supreme Court 
established the well-known two-step test for judicial deference to agency 
interpretations of law in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.1 According to the Chevron Court, an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with admin–
istering receives “considerable weight” if Congress has not addressed 
the precise question at issue and the agency’s interpretation is a 
permissible construction of the statute. 2  Chevron now faces an 
uncertain future and mounting criticism, including three Justices 
openly challenging the doctrine. 3  In fact, Congress recently made 
 
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. Id. at 842–44. 
3. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative 
power . . . .”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, 
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multiple attempts to replace Chevron deference with de novo review.4 
And some suggest that while judicial deference serves a critical function, 
federal courts’ application of the doctrine requires clarification or 
reform.5 
If the Court ultimately rejects Chevron, as some critics advocate,6 
it must still identify how federal courts should approach agency 
interpretations that have the force of law as well as those that do not.7 
Justifications for abandoning Chevron, or “great-weight” deference, 
include challenges to its constitutionality, allegations of systematic 
judicial bias, and its inconsistent application. 8  Some challenges to 
Chevron call for de novo review of all agency interpretations, restoring 
the judiciary to its constitutionally mandated position of independent 
judicial review under Article III.9  
But even before Chevron, courts deferred to agencies to some 
extent.10 In the nineteenth century, the judiciary was more concerned 
 
J., concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-power 
questions.”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150 (2014) (“In many ways, Chevron is nothing 
more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the 
Executive Branch.”); see also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the majority’s 
application of Chevron is “an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in 
interpreting federal statutes”). 
4. See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. 
§ 4(e) (2017); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. 
§ 107 (2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, S. 1577, 
115th Cong. § 2 (2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, 
H.R. 76, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
5. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call 
Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 
1143 (2012) (suggesting a reformulation of the Chevron doctrine to clarify 
the respective roles of courts and agencies in statutory interpretation); 
Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2154 (advocating for the elimination of 
Chevron’s threshold “clarity versus ambiguity decision”); Linda Jellum, 
Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
Admin. L. Rev. 725 (2007) (criticizing federal courts’ application of 
Chevron Step One); Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 
115 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 (2015) (advocating for greater clarity of the 
Chevron doctrine). 
6. See Phillip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 
1249–51 (2016). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 126–39. 
8. See generally Hamburger, supra note 6; Jonathan R. Siegel, The 
Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 937 (2018) 
(summarizing and challenging the main arguments against Chevron 
deference). 
9. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 6. 
10. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1154–55. 
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with courts engaging in “executive” and “administrative” decisions than 
it was with agencies encroaching on courts’ Article III powers.11 The 
growth of the administrative state gave rise to what became known as 
the appellate-review model, under which federal courts reviewed agency 
decisions just as they would review a trial court’s decisions.12 De novo 
review “failed to achieve a differentiation of functions, produced delay, 
and was duplicative and wasteful.” 13  Courts also recognized that 
agencies often had knowledge and expertise superior to their own.14 
Rejecting Chevron in favor of de novo review rejects an entire history 
of why courts deferred to agencies in the first place. But the options 
are not only Chevron deference or de novo review. For nearly thirty 
years, Idaho courts have experimented with a unique four-prong test 
for reviewing agencies’ statutory interpretations. This Note analyzes 
that test and envisions its hypothetical application in the federal court 
system as Chevron’s potential replacement. 
When one thinks of Idaho, one likely thinks of its potato fields or 
its vast stretches of forest. What does not likely come to mind is the 
judicial-deference test of this mountainous, northwestern state. No 
scholarship in the last decade has engaged Idaho’s deference doctrine,15 
and the recent spotlight has been on states abandoning deference for de 
novo review.16 Most states afford either some form of “great-weight” 
deference or no deference at all to agency interpretations.17 But the 
 
11. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of 
the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 
939, 980 (2011). 
12. Id. at 940, 953. 
13. Id. at 974. 
14. Id. at 999. 
15. See Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State 
Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron 
Doctrine, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 977 (2008). 
16. See, e.g., Amanda Reilly, Will States Follow Arizona in Assault on 
Chevron?, E&E News (May 9, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/ 
 1060081237 [https://perma.cc/RM8T-UG42]; Mark Chenoweth, Florida 
Voters Join Chevron Revolt and Strike a Blow Against Judicial Bias, 
Forbes (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markchenoweth/ 
 2018/11/08/florida-voters-join-chevron-revolt-and-strike-a-blow-against-
judicial-bias/#3feed3c04fe6 [https://perma.cc/KB89-V595]; Seyfarth Shaw 
LLP, Chevron Deference Under Attack at State Level, JDSupra (Apr. 
19, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/chevron-deference-under-
attack-at-state-21357/ [https://perma.cc/9684-LMPN]; Jonathan Wood, 
17 States: The Time Has Come to Reconsider Chevron Deference and 
This is the Case to Do it With, Pac. Legal Found. (July 6, 2018), 
https://pacificlegal.org/17-states-the-time-has-come-to-reconsider-chevron-
deference-and-this-is-the-case-to-do-it-with/ [https://perma.cc/F8ED-CQH8]. 
17. See, e.g., Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1196 (Cal. 2017) 
(affording “great weight and respect” to agency constructions); State ex 
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trend of the last two decades has been for states to abandon great-
weight-deference regimes in favor of de novo review for some of the 
same reasons critics challenge Chevron.18 Idaho, on the other hand, 
rejects such all-or-nothing approaches, instead employing a pragmatic, 
four-prong test that balances the complexity of the administrative state 
with the judiciary’s independent-review responsibility.19  
In formulating its four-prong test, the Idaho Supreme Court 
consulted its own case history, the deference principles of the other 
forty-nine states, and Chevron itself.20 In surveying its own history of 
judicial deference, the court summarized its initial respect for agency 
expertise and long-standing agency constructions, its increasing reliance 
on judicial deference, and its eventual rejection of great-weight 
deference. 21  While federal administrative law may be undergoing a 
similar transition,22 Idaho is one step ahead. After briefly abandoning 
its deference doctrine for no deference at all the Idaho judiciary 
returned to its well-established justifications for judicial deference, 
 
rel. Crowl v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Elections, 43 N.E.3d 406, 408 (Ohio 2015) 
(affording “great deference”); Goldberg v. Bd. of Health of Granby, 830 
N.E.2d 207, 213 (Mass. 2005) (applying a Chevron-like deference 
doctrine); Entergy La., LLC v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 221 So. 3d 801, 
805 (La. 2017) (agency interpretations of statutes receive no deference); 
Neilson Co. (US), LLC v. Cty. Bd. of Arlington Cty., 767 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Va. 
2015) (“[A] court never defers to an administrative interpretation . . . .”); 
see also sources cited infra note 18. 
18. See, e.g., H.B. 2238, 53rd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (“Section 12-910, 
Arizona Revised Statutes is amended to read: . . . the court shall decide 
all questions of law . . . without deference to any previous determination 
that may have been made . . . by the agency”); Fla. Const. art. V, 
§ 21 (“In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court . . . may not 
defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation . . . and must instead 
interpret such statute or rule de novo.”); Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 40, 54 (Wis. 2018) (rejecting a three-
tiered deference principle of “great weight,” “due weight,” and no 
deference at all in favor of de novo review); King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 
245 So. 3d 404, 407–08 (Miss. 2018) (abandoning a deference principle of 
“de novo but deferential review” for de novo review with no deference); 
SBC Mich. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 754 N.W.2d 259, 271–72 (Mich. 2008) 
(declining to adopt Chevron deference because “the unyielding deference 
to agency statutory construction required by Chevron conflicts . . . with 
the separation of powers principles”); Graham v. Dokter Trucking Grp., 
161 P.3d 695, 700–01 (Kan. 2007) (declining to award “great judicial 
deference” to agency determinations of questions of law on undisputed 
facts). 
19.  See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 
1991). 
20. Id. at 1212–19. 
21. Id. at 1214–17. 
22. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
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settling on an intermediate doctrine that it has consistently employed 
for nearly thirty years.23 
This Note explores Idaho’s intermediate approach in four parts. 
Part I explains the background and substance of Idaho’s four-prong 
test. Part II analyzes how Idaho courts apply each prong, comparing 
each prong to its closest Chevron counterpart. Part III briefly addresses 
how the four-prong test would fit into the federal deference regime, 
specifically addressing the deference doctrines of Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.,24 Auer v. Robbins,25 and National Cable and Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X Internet Services.26 In Skidmore, the Court held 
that courts should afford deference to agency interpretations to the 
extent that, “lacking [the] power to control,” the interpretation has the 
“power to persuade.”27 After Chevron, courts came to apply Skidmore 
to agency interpretations that lack the force of law.28 In Auer, the Court 
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation should control 
unless the regulation is unambiguous. 29  And under Brand X, an 
agency’s construction of a statute trumps a court’s prior interpretation 
unless the statute is unambiguous.30 Part III anticipates how Idaho’s 
four-prong test could either incorporate or render obsolete these federal 
doctrines. And Part IV suggests an improvement to Idaho’s test, 
specifically arguing that courts should apply each prong in a particular 
order. 
I. Idaho’s Four-Prong Test 
Idaho’s four-prong test arose out of the same situation that Chevron 
faces today. In Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission,31 
the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned a deference regime of “great 
weight” in favor of one of “free review” (i.e., de novo review).32 Despite 
“myriad cases stat[ing] that the construction given a statute by an 
 
23. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219. 
24. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
25. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
26. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
27. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 171–85. 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 186–204. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 205–08. 
31. 751 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1988). 
32. The term “free review” is unique to Idaho. Id. at 109–10. As applied by 
the Idaho judiciary, it refers to independent judicial review, or what other 
states and the federal courts refer to as de novo review. See A&B 
Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Idaho 
2012). 
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administrative agency is entitled to great weight,” the court found 
“cogent reasons for straying from the Commission’s reading of the 
statute and recognizing that the construction of a statute is [a] matter 
of law for the judiciary.”33 The court then proceeded to apply the free-
review standard.34 The Fair Share court did not broadly declare that it 
was abandoning great-weight deference generally; rather, it found 
“cogent reasons” to “apply the standard of free review to the 
Commission’s interpretation.”35 
Three years later, in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission,36 the Idaho Supreme Court read Fair Share as a complete 
departure from great-weight deference. 37  At issue in Simplot was 
whether the income of Simplot’s foreign subsidiaries could be combined 
with that of its domestic subsidiaries for the purpose of computing its 
“Idaho taxable income.”38 Simplot’s foreign subsidiaries had no taxable 
income as defined by the Idaho Tax Code. The Tax Commission, 
however, argued that the Idaho tax law did not answer “whether foreign 
source income [could] be included in the ‘preapportionment tax base’ of 
a multinational corporation.”39 Specifically, it argued that it could use 
the foreign-source income to calculate the amount of income 
apportionable to Idaho even if it did not consider the foreign-source 
income as “taxable.” 40  The Commission further argued that the 
provision controlling the apportionment calculation was a specific 
statutory provision and, therefore, it should outweigh the more general 
provision defining “taxable income.”41 
The district court initially favored Simplot’s construction of the 
law, calling the Commission’s interpretation “a strained and harsh 
interpretation on a series of statutes that otherwise have a plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning.”42 The Idaho legislature, however, had 
previously passed a law that allowed corporations with foreign 
subsidiaries to choose whether they wanted to exclude their foreign-
source income from the apportionment process.43 The district court 
found that Simplot’s position—that its foreign-source income was, by 
 
33. Idaho Fair Share, 751 P.2d at 109–10. 
34. Id. at 110. 
35. Id. at 109–10. 
36. 820 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 1991). 
37. Id. at 1211–12. 
38. Id. at 1207. 
39. Id. at 1208–09. 
40. Id. at 1209. 
41. Id. at 1208–09. 
42. Id. at 1209. 
43. Id. at 1210. 
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definition, not “taxable income”—would render the new law 
superfluous. The district court denied Simplot relief on this basis.44 
Simplot appealed the district court’s decision to the Idaho Supreme 
Court.45 The supreme court rejected the district court’s legal theory, 
noting that the legislature is not required to make significant changes 
when it enacts legislation.46 Nevertheless, the court noted that it was 
still free to affirm the district court’s judgment if it could be supported 
by some other correct legal theory.47 The court began its analysis with 
the Commission’s interpretation of the Idaho Income Tax Act, noting 
that Idaho had “long followed” great-weight deference until Fair Share, 
when the court “substantially limited this rule.”48 The court suggested 
that the free-review standard undermined its precedent of affording 
deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations.49 As the Simplot court 
saw it, free review allowed the court to ignore an agency’s interpretation 
whenever the court disagreed with it. 50  Seeking to resolve Idaho’s 
“tenuous and uncertain” rule of judicial deference, the court surveyed 
other states’ deference regimes, the majority of which had shifted 
towards free review.51 The Simplot court was also unpersuaded by a 
return to great-weight deference, finding that those tests led to 
inconsistent results, “leaving the impression that their administrative 
agency interpretations are entitled to judicial deference only when those 
interpretations are correct.”52 The court further commented, “a rule 
that an agency construction will be followed only when it is correct is 
no rule at all.”53 
 The court then turned to its own case history, identifying five 
primary rationales for deferring to agencies. First, “the rule ensures 
repose when important interests have ‘grown up’ in reliance on an 
interpretation in existence for a number of years.”54 Second, “an agency 
interpretation represents a ‘practical’ interpretation” because “stat–
utory language is often of necessity general and therefore cannot address 
all of the details necessary for its effective implementation.”55 Third, 
 
44. Id. at 1209–10. 
45. Id. at 1210. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1210–11. 
49. Id. at 1212. 
50. Id. at 1211–12. 
51. Id. at 1212. 
52. Id. at 1213. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1215. 
55. Id. 
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“the legislature is charged with knowledge of how its statutes are 
interpreted,” and “[b]y not altering the statutory text the legislature is 
presumed to have sanctioned the agency interpretation.” 56  Fourth, 
“when [an agency’s construction] is formulated contemporaneously with 
the passage of the statute in question,” that construction “is entitled to 
additional weight” because “the agency may have insight into 
legislative intent at the time of enactment.”57 And fifth, some agencies 
have more specialized expertise.58 
The Simplot court also briefly acknowledged Chevron deference and 
its underlying rationale of agency expertise. 59  Finally, the court 
concluded that it should not apply free review to agency interpretations. 
Rather, the court held that a “four-prong test” was the proper way to 
determine the appropriate level of judicial deference that an agency 
interpretation deserves. The four prongs are as follows: (1) whether the 
agency has been “entrusted with the responsibility to administer the 
statute at issue”;60 (2) whether the agency’s construction is reasonable;61 
(3) whether the statutory text “expressly treat[s] the precise question 
at issue”;62 and (4) “whether any of the rationales underlying the rule 
of deference are present.”63 If an agency interpretation satisfies all four 
prongs, the court must give the agency’s construction “considerable 
weight.”64 If the interpretation fails under Prong Four, it is left to its 
“persuasive force.”65 While the Simplot court did not expressly say what 
level of deference, if any, is appropriate when an agency construction 
fails on Prongs One, Two, or Three, Idaho courts uniformly apply free 
review in those cases.66 
 
56. Id. at 1216. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1218. 





65. Id. at 1219–20. 
66. See, e.g., Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 n.2 (Idaho 2009) 
(affording no deference because the interpretation failed Prong Three); 
A&B Irrigation Distrib. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270, 
1272 (Idaho 2002) (affording no deference because the interpretation failed 
Prong One); N. Snake Groundwater Distrib. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 
376 P.3d 722, 729 (Idaho 2016) (affording no deference because the 
interpretation failed Prong Three). 
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II. Comparing Simplot and Chevron 
A. Prong One: Is the agency entrusted with the authority to administer 
the statute? 
Under Prong One, the court asks whether “the agency has been 
entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue.”67 
If the answer is yes, the agency is “‘impliedly clothed with power to 
construe’ the law.”68 In Simplot, the court generally stated that the Tax 
Commission was “impliedly clothed with power to construe” the 
statutes at issue, but it did not reference the specific statutory 
provisions from which the Tax Commission derived this authority.69 
Of the four prongs, Prong One receives the least analysis in 
subsequent cases. Courts typically do no more than briefly declare that 
the agency does or does not have the authority to construe the statute, 
as in Simplot. 70  For example, in Pearl v. Board of Professional 
Discipline,71 the Board had the authority to construe the statute at 
issue because it had statutory authority to “establish pursuant to the 
administrative procedure act rules and regulations for the admin–
istration of this chapter.”72 In A&B Irrigation Distribution v. Idaho 
Department of Water Resources, 73  however, the Director of the 
Department of Water lacked the authority to administer the statute at 
issue because the Director could point to no legislative directive 
granting such authority. Instead, the Director argued that it had 
authority to interpret the statute under the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (IAPA).74 But the Director pointed only to the provision 
of the IAPA that mandated that the Director comply with the IAPA.75 
The court concluded that “[a] legislative directive that [the Depart–
ment] comply with the IAPA cannot reasonably be construed as dele–
gating to [the Department] the responsibility for administering the 
 
67. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219. 
68. Id. (quoting Kopp v. State, 595 P.2d 309, 312 (Idaho 1979)). 
69. Id. at 1220 (quoting Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312). 
70. See, e.g., Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 73 P.3d 721, 
729–30 (Idaho 2003); Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery 
Comm’n, 156 P.3d 524, 527 (Idaho 2007); Canty v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983, 988 (Idaho 2002); Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d 
318, 321 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017). 
71. 44 P.3d 1162 (Idaho 2002). 
72. Id. at 1168 (quoting Idaho Code § 54-1806(2) (2018)). 
73. 301 P.3d 1270 (Idaho 2012). 
74. Id. at 1272. 
75. Id. 
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IAPA.”76 The court then exercised free review to decide the appropriate 
statutory construction.77 
Idaho courts sometimes conflate Prong One with Prong Two or 
Three, but this is not common practice.78 For example, in North Snake 
Groundwater Distribution v. Idaho Department of Water Resources,79 
the Director of the Department of Water Resources lacked the 
authority to interpret a specific statutory term because the Idaho 
legislature already defined that term in the statute.80 Thus, the court 
gave no deference to the Director’s interpretation, referencing Simplot.81 
But the North Snake court conflated the issue of the agency’s authority 
with whether the statutory text answers the precise question at issue, 
which the court addresses under Prong Three. Most Idaho courts look 
to the agency’s authorizing statute to determine whether it has 
authority to interpret the statute at issue, as in Pearl and A&B 
Irrigation.82 But in some cases, the answer is so obvious that the court 
fails to cite to the authorizing statute and generally concludes the 
agency has the authority to administer the statute.83 
Although Chevron deference is described as a two-step test, courts 
really engage in three inquiries.84 The first is what some refer to as 
“Chevron Step Zero,” which emerged from the Supreme Court’s holding 
in United States v. Mead Corp.85 Chevron Step Zero requires the court 
to determine whether Congress delegated to the agency the authority 
to promulgate rules carrying the force of law, and whether the agency 
did so.86 Only when the answer to both questions is “yes” may the court 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1272–74. 
78. See, e.g., Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 
(Idaho 2002) (correctly applying Prong One to determine that the agency 
has authority to administer the statute). 
79. 376 P.3d 722 (Idaho 2016). 
80. Id. at 729. 
81. Id. at 728–29. 
82. Pearl, 44 P.3d at 1162; A&B Irrigation Distrib., 301 P.3d at 1272; see 
also Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 232 P.3d 322, 325 (Idaho 2010); 
Hood v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 868 P.2d 479, 481–82 (Idaho 
1994). 
83. See, e.g., Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm’n, 156 
P.3d 524, 527 (2007); Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983, 
988 (Idaho 2002); Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d 318, 321 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2017). 
84. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 190–91 (2006). 
85. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
86. Id. at 226–27. 
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continue to Chevron Step One.87 If the answer is “no,” then the court’s 
deference analysis proceeds under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.88 or Auer v. 
Robbins.89 Agencies act with the force of law through adjudication, 
notice-and-comment rule making, or another comparable indication of 
Congress’s intent. 90  While Chevron Step Zero appears similar to 
Simplot’s Prong One, it differs in at least one important respect. 
Simplot’s Prong One asks only whether the agency has authority to do 
whatever it did, not whether the agency acted with the force of law. In 
fact, Idaho has no secondary deference test for interpretations lacking 
the force of law. Rather, Idaho courts focus on whether the agency 
action interprets a statute, regulation, or informal rule.91 
Prong One also differs from Chevron Step One. Chevron Step One 
asks whether the legislature expressly or implicitly granted the agency 
authority to construe the law, asking specifically whether “Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”92 The Chevron court 
emphasized that Congress can implicitly delegate to the agency 
interpretive authority via ambiguous statutory language.93 In Simplot, 
the agency derives its authority to administer the statute only from the 
agency’s authorizing statute, not ambiguity in the text. 94  In fact, 
notwithstanding Prong Three, the Simplot court did not recognize 
implicit delegation through ambiguity as a justification for deferring to 
agencies.95 Instead, the Simplot court appreciated the permanence of 
the administrative state and the utility of agencies in the administration 
of the law.96 It premised agency deference on the idea that the court 
 
87. Id. 
88. See infra Part III.A. (explaining that Skidmore deference applies when 
agency interpretation fails Chevron Step Zero by the agency acting 
without the force of law). 
89. See infra Part III.B. (explaining that in Auer the Court held that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own rules should be given deference unless 
it is clearly inconsistent with the rules). 
90. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227. 
91. While Idaho courts do not employ this terminology, they distinguish 
between agency interpretations that are promulgated through the 
procedural requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act and 
those that are not. See State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d 219, 225 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2013). 
92. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984). 
93. Id. at 844–45. 
94. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho 
1991).  
95. Id. 
96. See id. at 1211. 
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can no longer interpret and apply the law without some aid from 
agencies.97 
Indeed, Idaho courts recognize that the Idaho legislature delegates 
authority to an agency through the agency’s administering statute.98 
When “charged with the duty of administering an act,” the agency “is 
impliedly clothed with the power to construe it.”99 Thus, “[t]he court 
must first determine if the agency has been entrusted with the 
responsibility to administer the statute at issue.”100 Only if the agency 
has received this authority will it be “‘impliedly clothed with the power 
to construe’ the law.”101 This language originates in Kopp v. State.102 In 
Kopp, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the Department of Law 
Enforcement had broad powers to carry out provisions of Idaho’s Retail 
Sale of Liquor by the Drink Act based on the fact that the Department 
is responsible for administering and enforcing the Act.103 The court 
further held that the Department’s interpretation of the Act was 
entitled to “great weight.”104 But the Kopp court made no finding that 
the legislature had implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the 
Department because the Act’s text was ambiguous. In fact, while noting 
that it had never interpreted the provision of the Act at issue, the court 
restated the parties’ competing interpretations but never expressly 
declared the statute to be ambiguous.105 After consulting the Act’s 
legislative history, the court concluded that the Department’s inter–
pretation was correct.106 The Kopp court cited numerous cases for the 
“impliedly clothed” language, none of which suggest that the legislature 
implicitly delegates interpretive authority to agencies through 
ambiguity in statutes.107 Because the power to construe the law is a 
“necessary precedent to administrative action,”108 delegation to agencies 
 
97. Id. 
98. See infra text accompanying notes 99–108. 
99. Kopp v. State, 595 P.2d 309, 312 (Idaho 1979). 
100. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219. 
101. Id. (quoting Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312). 
102. Kopp, 595 P.2d at 312. 
103. Id.  
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 311–12. 
106. Id. at 313. 
107. See id. at 312 (citing Okla. Real Estate Comm’n v. Nat’l Bus. & Prop. 
Exch., Inc., 238 F.2d 606, 610 (10th Cir. 1956); Clark County Sch. Dist. 
v. Local Gov. Emp. Mgmt. Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114, 117 (Nev. 1974); 
Wash. Twp. of Nemaha Cty. v. Hart, 215 P.2d 180 (Kan. 1950); Bodison 
Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 109 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal. 1941)). 
108. Id. 
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is implicit only in the sense that an agency’s authority to administer 
the law implies that it has the authority to interpret the law. 
B. Prong Two: Is the agency’s construction a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute? 
For Prong Two, the Simplot court noted that Idaho courts 
consistently found deference inappropriate when an agency inter–
pretation “is so obscure and doubtful that it is entitled to no weight or 
consideration.” 109  In its analysis of the Tax Commission’s inter–
pretation, the Simplot court generally concluded that the Commission’s 
construction was reasonable “in the face of a statute that does not 
directly address the question at issue.” 110  While the Commission 
overlooked the statutory definition of “taxable income,” it was not 
unreasonable for the Commission to conclude that a more specific 
provision controlled over the more general definition.111 
In determining whether an agency’s construction is reasonable, 
Idaho courts look to whether the agency’s construction is consistent 
with the statutory text, the legislature’s intent, and practices common 
to the relevant industry.112 For example, in Pearl, a physician argued 
that the Idaho Medical Practices Act required the Board of Professional 
Discipline of the State Board of Medicine to hold its disciplinary 
hearings with a panel of licensed physicians instead of a non-physician 
hearing officer.113 The Act granted the Board the authority to hold a 
disciplinary hearing with a panel of licensed physicians.114 But the Act 
also allowed non-physician hearing officers to conduct evidentiary 
hearings. 115  In no way did the Act restrict the hearing officers’ 
authority. Thus, the court found that it was reasonable for the Board 
to conclude that the hearing officer could issue a recommendation based 
on its evidentiary-hearing findings.116 Likewise, in Hamilton v. Reeder 
Flying Services, Inc., 117  the court found reasonable the Industrial 
 
109. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho 
1991) (quoting State v. Omaechevviaria, 152 P. 280, 281 (Idaho 1915)). 
110. Id. at 1220. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1214, 1219.  
113. Pearl v. Bd. of Prof. Discipline, 44 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Idaho 2002). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1168; see also Floating Patio, LLC v. Idaho State Police, No. CV 
2016 4100, 2017 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 24, at *16–17 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Apr. 20, 
2017) (finding the agency’s interpretation to be reasonable when the 
statute provided that undefined words should be given their ordinary and 
commonly understood meanings, and the agency applied the dictionary 
definition of a term not defined in the statute). 
117. 21 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2001). 
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Commission’s interpretation that the term “employed” meant the 
moment when fertilizer pilots took their first flight of the season, not 
when the employer “employed” them in the ordinary sense of the 
word.118 The court found the interpretation reasonable in light of the 
Commission’s long-standing custom, the legislature’s intent, and the 
practical effect a contrary interpretation would have on the industry.119 
Prong Two, like Chevron’s Step Two, allows the court to engage in 
a full consideration of a statute’s meaning,120  looking to the outer 
bounds of the text. Under Chevron Step Two, the court looks to 
whether the agency’s construction is a permissible reading of the 
statute. 121  If the answer is “yes,” the court defers to the agency’s 
interpretation. 122 But a reasonable interpretation is not enough under 
Simplot’s Prong Two: the interpretation must still satisfy all three other 
prongs, and the five rationales under Prong Four must weigh in favor 
of deference.123 Thus, an interpretation that receives Chevron deference 
because it is a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute may 
not always receive deference under Simplot. 
C. Prong Three: Does the text answer the precise question at issue? 
For Prong Three, the Simplot court explained that an agency’s 
construction cannot contradict the clear expressions of the legislature.124 
Although Prong Three employs nearly the same language as Chevron 
Step One—“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue”125—Simplot differs in practice. When Idaho courts 
apply each prong in numerical order, reaching Prong Three third, the 
court must engage in the reasonableness inquiry under Prong Two 
before determining whether the text answers the precise question at 
issue.126 As discussed further in Part IV, this difference speaks to the 
linguistic limitations of Chevron Step One. A court can ask whether the 
language treats the precise question at issue, but the answer may 
 
118. Id. at 895. 
119. Id. at 893–94. 
120. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 1004. 
121. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
122. Id. at 843–44. 
123. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 998–99. 
124. J.R. Simplot, Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho 
1991) (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”) (quoting Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842–43). 
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see also Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219 (framing 
Prong Three as asking whether the question has “a precise statutory 
answer”). 
126. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 998.  
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depend more on a judge’s interpretive approach than the language of 
the statute itself.127 When a court frames Chevron Step One as an 
inquiry into whether the statute has a plain meaning and limits that 
inquiry to the words of the statute (e.g., under a strict constructionist 
or textualist approach), the court is more likely to find the statute does 
have a plain meaning than if the court employed a purposivist 
approach.128 Chevron’s plain-meaning inquiry usually devolves into a 
“clearly preferred”-meaning inquiry depending on how the court frames 
Step One, making deference to the agency less likely.129 Under Simplot, 
the court must first approach the statute with a wide lens, asking 
whether the agency’s construction is reasonable. Then, within the 
context of that reasonableness inquiry, the court looks to whether the 
statutory text already answers the question at issue.130 This framework 
guides the court’s analysis away from a textualist approach towards a 
more purposivist approach. 
Yet Prong Three is still susceptible to the same linguistic mani–
pulation as Chevron Step One. When Idaho courts stray from the exact 
language of Prong Three, they typically do so by asking whether the 
statute is ambiguous, 131  potentially making Prong Three’s outcome 
dependent on the court’s preferred method of statutory interpretation. 
Although Prong Two guards against this manipulation by requiring the 
court to analyze the reasonableness of the interpretation first, some 
Idaho courts address the prongs out of order, beginning and ending the 
inquiry with Prong Three.132 When the court addresses the prongs out 
of order and frames Prong Three in terms of whether the statute is 
ambiguous, the four-prong test could result in less deference to agencies, 
just as with Chevron. 
In Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund,133 the Idaho Supreme 
Court did just that. Without analyzing Prongs One or Four, the court 
held that the agency’s interpretation deserved no deference because the 
interpretation failed Prongs Two and Three.134 Under Prong Three, the 
court asked whether the statute was ambiguous.135 But this was likely 
because of the case’s procedural posture. The plaintiff appealed the 
 
127. See infra text accompanying notes 212–19. 
128. Id. 
129. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale 
L.J. 969, 991 (1992). 
130. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219. 
131. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 208 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho 2009); 
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 895 (Idaho 2001). 
132. Farber, 208 P.3d at 293–94. 
133. Id. at 289. 
134. Id. at 296. 
135. Id. 
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district court’s finding that the statute was ambiguous.136 Neither party 
brought an argument under Simplot at the district-court level, and the 
State Insurance Fund raised it before the supreme court only as an 
alternative argument.137 The supreme court first addressed the district 
court’s finding that the statute was ambiguous, disagreeing with the 
district court. 138  Then, upon addressing the Fund’s alternative 
argument under Simplot, the supreme court concluded that the Fund’s 
interpretation failed Prong Three because the statute was not 
ambiguous and it precisely treated the question at issue.139 
But Idaho courts typically address the prongs in numerical order.140 
In Simplot, the court briefly addressed Prong Three third, finding that 
the legislature had not “directly address[ed] the question . . . of 
whether foreign source income can be included in the preapportionment 
tax base . . . for the purpose of computing Idaho taxable income.”141 
Idaho courts’ Prong Three analyses are usually brief,142 likely because 
this prong is not issue determinative, and because the court has already 
analyzed whether the interpretation is reasonable under Prong Two.143 
If the agency’s interpretation survives Prong Two as a reasonable 
interpretation, then it is unlikely that the language of the statute treats 
the precise question at issue, unless the agency’s answer comports with 
what the statute requires. And sometimes, as in Farber, Idaho courts 
look to whether the statutory language is unambiguous before 
determining whether the agency’s construction is entitled to deference 
under Simplot.144 In these cases, the agency’s construction receives little 
 
136. Id. at 292. 
137. Id. at 295. 
138. Id. at 293–94. 
139. Id. at 296. But see Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 
337 P.3d 655, 662 (Idaho 2014) (finding the Board’s interpretation 
reasonable and thus entitled to deference under Simplot’s four-prong test). 
140. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Idaho, 403 P.3d 318, 321–22 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017); 
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 893 (Idaho 2001); Garner 
v. Horkley Oil, 853 P.2d 576, 578–79 (Idaho 1993); Preston v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm’n, 960 P.2d 185, 187–89 (Idaho 1998); A & B Irrigation Dist. 
v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 301 P.3d 1270, 1272 (Idaho 2012); Kuna 
Boxing Club Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm’n, 233 P.3d 25 (2009); Canty v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 59 P.3d 983, 988–90 (Idaho 2002). 
141. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220 (Idaho 
1991). 
142. See, e.g., Canty, 59 P.3d at 987; Hamilton, 21 P.3d at 895; Garner, 853 
P.2d at 577. 
143. See Pappas, supra note 15, at 1006. 
144. Farber, 208 P.3d at 293–95. 
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analysis under Prong Three because the court has already determined 
whether the statutory language is clear.145 
D. Prong Four: Do the rationales traditionally justifying deference 
weigh in favor of deference? 
Prong Four permits the court to ask whether it makes sense to defer 
to the agency. The Simplot court incorporated the five rationales 
underlying Idaho’s deference regime into this prong: reliance, 
practicality, legislative acquiescence or endorsement, contemporaneity, 
and specialized expertise.146 Simplot does not require all rationales to be 
present; rather, the test requires the court to balance the absence or 
presence of each rationale, which the court does not have to weigh 
equally. The absence of one or more of the rationales may constitute a 
“cogent reason” for refusing to defer to an agency’s interpretation.147 
The Simplot court specified that the absence of even one rationale, if 
weighed heavily enough, could be a sufficient reason for denying 
deference to the agency interpretation.148 And the court could weigh the 
presence of only one rationale strongly enough for it to award the 
agency’s interpretation “considerable weight” deference. 149  If, after 
analyzing the five rationales, a court finds that there are no compelling 
reasons to depart from the agency’s interpretation, then the court must 
give “considerable weight” to the agency’s construction.150 If balancing 
the rationales reveals compelling reasons for denying deference to the 
agency, then the court may still defer to the agency’s construction to 
the extent of its “persuasive force.”151 
The Simplot court noted that under its pre-Fair Share deference 
doctrine, courts could generally claim that “cogent reasons” existed for 
denying deference without specifying what those reasons were.152 Now, 
the court retains some flexibility, but it must explain its analysis in 
terms of Prong Four’s five rationales. A court cannot claim that “cogent 
reasons” exist for rejecting the agency interpretation without explaining 
those reasons.153 
 
145. See Canty, 59 P.3d at 987–89 (looking first to the language of the statute, 
then applying in order the four prongs, and finding that the statute does 
not answer the precise question at issue). 
146. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 





151. Id. at 1219–20. 
152. Id. at 1211–12. 
153. Id. at 1219. 
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In Simplot, the court held that the Tax Commission’s interpretation 
was not entitled to considerable deference after balancing the five 
rationales because all five rationales were absent. 154  There was no 
reliance interest in Simplot’s interpretation of the tax law given the 
recent legislation. And the court found that the Tax Commission’s 
interpretation was no more practical than Simplot’s;155 if anything, 
Simplot’s interpretation was more practical than the Commission’s. 
The legislature could not have acquiesced to the Commission’s 
interpretation because the 1985 Idaho Income Tax Act included express 
language that denied any legislative intent as to the construction of 
prior versions of the Act,156 and legislative inaction is not a reliable 
source of legislative intent.157 The Tax Commission did not issue its 
interpretation contemporaneously with the tax law because the Idaho 
tax law was most recently revised in 1979, and the disputed 
interpretation arose out of deficiency notices issued in 1984.158 As for 
the last rationale—agency expertise—even though the Tax Commission 
was an expert in Idaho taxation, the Commission did not employ its 
expertise in construing the statute. It prepared no regulations or written 
instructions. It communicated its interpretation only by issuing notices 
of deficiency determinations years after the taxes had been filed.159 On 
this point, the court also noted that the Tax Commission did not 
“exhaust[] its thinking” on the interpretation prior to the instant 
litigation. 160  Because not one of the five rationales justified the 
Commission’s interpretation, the court held that there were “cogent 
reasons” to deny “considerable weight” to the agency’s interpretation.161 
Finally, with the agency’s construction left to its “persuasive force,” the 
court rejected that construction, calling it a “strained” reading of an 
otherwise straightforward statute.162 
While Prong Four lacks similarity to Chevron in all respects, it 
resembles the factors courts employed pre-Chevron. Thomas Merrill 
categorizes the pre-Chevron factors into three groups: (1) those 
addressing Congressional intent; (2) factors addressing attributes of the 
agency’s decision; and (3) those demonstrating congruence between the 
 
154. Id. at 1220. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1221. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1222. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1223. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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agency’s interpretation and Congress’s intent. 163  When analyzing 
factors in the first grouping, courts looked to whether Congress had 
specifically delegated authority to an agency.164 For factors in group 
two, the court considered whether an agency exercised its expertise, 
whether its interpretation represented a consistent interpretation, and 
whether the interpretation was the fruit of reasoned analysis.165 Courts 
analyzed group three’s factors by considering whether the agency’s 
construction was contemporaneous with the passage of the statute or 
whether Congress had ratified the agency’s construction. 166  The 
Chevron Court also looked to similar rationales for deferring to 
agencies: filling gaps left by Congress, reconciling conflicting policies, 
and giving due weight to an agency’s expertise.167 More recently, in 
Kisor v. Wilkie,168 the Supreme Court articulated similar factors for 
consideration when deciding whether to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation (i.e., Auer deference). 169  This 
suggests that the rationales for deference identified in Simplot are 
consistent with those imbedded in the U.S. Supreme Court’s history of 
judicial deference. As Merrill notes, the Court has employed some of 
the above factors for over 150 years, and they may “reflect[] deep-seated 
judicial intuitions about the kinds of considerations that ought to bear 
on the decision to defer.”170 
III. Fitting into the Deference Puzzle 
This section examines how Simplot would fit into the federal 
administrative landscape, specifically addressing Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., Auer v. Robbins, and National Cable and Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X. If the Supreme Court abandons Chevron 
deference, it will raise a plethora of questions about how the court 
should continue to apply Skidmore and Auer deference, if at all, and 
whether Brand X’s holding still applies. 
 
163. Merrill, supra note 129, at 973. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 973–74. 
166. Id. at 974. 
167. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
45 (1984). 
168. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).  
169. See id. at 2416–17 (directing courts to consider “markers” for identifying 
when Auer deference is appropriate, including whether the interpretation 
is authoritative, whether the interpretation implicates the agency’s 
substantive expertise, and whether the interpretation reflects the agency’s 
“fair and considered judgment”). 
170. Merrill, supra note 129, at 975. 
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A. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 
Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,171 courts may defer to agency 
interpretations, with the weight of deference depending on “the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”172 
While Chevron first left courts confused about the status and 
applicability of Skidmore deference,173 United States v. Mead Corp.174 
clarified that Skidmore applies when an agency interpretation fails 
Chevron Step Zero; or in other words, when an agency acts without the 
force of law. 175  Even though Idaho’s four-prong test does not ask 
whether the agency acted with the force of law, its framework still 
allows for federal courts to apply Skidmore deference at two junctures. 
First, federal courts could apply Skidmore deference to agency 
interpretations of regulations or informal rules.176 Simplot applies only 
to an agency’s statutory interpretations, and Idaho courts employ the 
free-review standard when interpreting an agency’s interpretations of 
regulations or rules. 177  Rather than asking at Chevron Step Zero 
whether an agency acted with the force of law, courts would identify 
the agency’s interpretation as a construction of a statute, a regulation, 
or an informal rule. When the agency is construing a regulation or 
informal rule, the court would apply Skidmore deference. 
Second, courts could apply Skidmore after Prong Four. Because an 
agency’s construction deserves no deference when it fails at Prong One, 
Two, or Three, these prongs are the threshold issues for whether the 
interpretation deserves any deference at all. Once an interpretation 
survives the first three prongs, the remaining question is not whether to 
defer to the agency, but how much deference is appropriate. At this 
point, the agency’s interpretation will receive at least some deference 
according to its “persuasive value” after the court analyzes Prong 
Four’s five deference rationales. If the interpretation fails Prong Four, 
courts could then apply Skidmore. The only difference is that the 
decision about whether to apply Skidmore occurs at Simplot Prong Four 
rather than Chevron Step Zero. 
 
171. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
172. Id. at 140. 
173. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1237 (2007). 
174. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
175. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 173, at 1237. 
176. This would supplant Auer deference. See supra notes 143–159 and 
accompanying text. 
177. Mason v. Donnelly, 21 P.3d 903, 905 (Idaho 2001). 
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On the other hand, federal courts can determine quite quickly 
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore. 178  One could argue that 
applying Skidmore after applying Simplot’s first three prongs and 
analyzing five different deference rationales under its fourth prong is 
far more analysis than necessary, if not completely superfluous. By the 
time a court has analyzed Prong Four’s rationales and finds no 
compelling reasons for affording an agency great-weight deference, it 
has already fully assessed the persuasive value of the agency’s 
interpretation. There are few cases in which an agency’s interpretation 
fails Prong Four after having survived the first three; but when it does, 
it may receive no deference at all.179 
But federal courts continue to apply a multi-factor analysis when 
determining whether to apply Skidmore or Chevron, as the Supreme 
Court did in Barnhart v. Walton.180 Under Barnhart, courts may look 
to more than the formality of the procedures through which an agency 
issued an interpretation. Specifically, courts should consider the 
agency’s interpretive method and the nature of the question at issue.181 
The Barnhart Court considered “the interstitial nature of the legal 
question, the related expertise of the [a]gency, the importance of the 
question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of that 
administration, and the careful consideration the [a]gency has given the 
question over a long period.”182 The rationales of Prong Four do not 
represent every justification for deferring to an agency interpretation; 
the Idaho Supreme Court identified only those justifications supported 
by its own case history.183 Incorporating Skidmore would allow federal 
courts to consider additional rationales to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation the court finds somewhat persuasive, even if that 
interpretation is not entitled to great weight.184 
 
178. See, e.g., Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(finding that Chevron “clearly applies” to the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the INA); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of 
Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 48 (D.C. Dist. 2018) (finding that the 
Department of Education’s interpretation of the Higher Education Act 
“qualified as ‘an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,’ 
positioned squarely within the Chevron framework”). 
179. See, e.g., Johnston v. Bureau of Crim. Identification, No. CV-2012-1442, 
2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 20 at *10–12 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012). 
180. 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (applying Chevron to an agency interpretation 
promulgated through less formal means than notice-and-comment). 
181. Id. at 222. 
182. Id. 
183. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1214–15 
(Idaho 1991). 
184. See Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 363 F. Supp. 3d 67, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding 
that agency guidelines deserved “considerable deference” even if not 
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Still, if applying Skidmore after Prong Four is superfluous, courts 
could reduce their Skidmore analysis to a one-sentence conclusion 
stating that, through its four-prong analysis, it finds that the agency’s 
interpretation lacks persuasive force. Idaho courts already take a similar 
approach when an interpretation fails Prong Four.185 And so eventually, 
courts might cease to apply Skidmore at all. 
Despite these issues, the transition from Chevron to Idaho’s four-
prong test would raise fewer questions about Skidmore’s validity than 
would transitioning from Chevron to de novo review. If the Supreme 
Court abandons Chevron deference for de novo review but changes 
nothing with respect to Skidmore deference, lower federal courts would 
be left with a deference scheme in which an agency’s interpretations 
promulgated with the force of law receive less deference than its 
guidelines and opinion letters that the courts find persuasive. The only 
way the Court could abandon Chevron without having to immediately 
address Skidmore’s validity would be to either apply Skidmore to all 
agency interpretations rather than resorting to de novo review or 
abandon Skidmore as well. With its capacity to incorporate Skidmore, 
Idaho’s four-prong test resolves these inconsistencies and allows 
Skidmore to simply fade into the background, should courts find the 
additional analysis unnecessary. 
B. Auer v. Robbins 
In Auer v. Robbins,186 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior ruling 
in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,187 where the Court held that 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation demands deference 
unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”188 The Auer Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation of its own regulations regarding whether employees were 
entitled to overtime pay. Because the Secretary was interpreting its 
own regulation, the Court looked to whether the interpretation was 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”;189 if it was not, 
 
entitled to Chevron deference because “they were passed with extensive 
process and formality, are detailed and reflect [the agency’s] considerable 
expertise . . . , and are routinely cited by courts as persuasive authority 
on the meaning of the [statute]”); Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 
314 F. Supp. 3d 135, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (applying Barnhart’s factors 
to determine whether Chevron applies to the agency’s action). 
185. See Johnston v. Bureau of Crim. Identification, No. CV-2012-1442, 2012 
Ida. Dist. LEXIS 20 at *10–12 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2012). 
186. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
187. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
188. Id. at 414. 
189. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989). 
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the Secretary’s interpretation controlled.190 The Court found that the 
agency’s construction “easily met” this standard because the language 
of the regulation “comfortably [bore] the meaning the Secretary 
assign[ed].”191 
Like Chevron, Auer has received its share of criticism.192 In fact, 
these criticisms were recently at the forefront in Kisor v. Wilkie,193 in 
which the Supreme Court declined to overturn the doctrine.194 While 
Auer may be described as the application of Chevron to an agency’s 
interpretations of its own regulations,195 it is an independent doctrine 
that reaffirms Seminole Rock, which pre-dates Chevron by nearly forty 
years.196 Thus, it is at least conceivable that Auer could stand on its 
own in the absence of Chevron if the Court finds that the two doctrines 
are supported by different justifications.197 
Whether Auer could exist in harmony with Simplot’s four-prong 
test depends on whether federal courts would analyze an agency’s 
interpretations of administrative regulations or rules under Simplot or 




192. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–19 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (urging the Court 
to reconsider Auer deference because “the power to write a law and the 
power to interpret it cannot rest in the same hands”); John F. Manning, 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 617 (1996) (arguing that 
Seminole Rock deference should be replaced by “a standard that imposes 
an independent judicial check on the agency’s determination of regulatory 
meaning”). 
193. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
194. Id. at 2407. 
195. Decker, 568 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
196. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
197. See Manning, supra note 192, at 617–18 (suggesting that Chevron is 
premised on the principle that Congress delegates policy discretion to 
agencies through ambiguity, and Seminole Rock is premised on the idea 
of an agency’s “superior political accountability, policymaking 
competence, and historical familiarity with the regulatory text”); see also 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Issues 
surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own 
regulations are distinct from those raised in connection with judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress.”); id. 
at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Chief 
Justice Roberts that the Court’s ruling on Auer deference should not be 
read to implicate Chevron deference). 
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review—the free-review standard—to agency regulations and rules.198 
Thus, federal courts could apply Simplot to agency interpretations of 
statutes while continuing to apply Auer to agency interpretations of 
administrative regulations. 
But this would contravene the main justifications for adopting 
Idaho’s four-prong test in the first place. Auer demands deference to 
agency interpretations of regulations that are not “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation,” a standard the Simplot court 
rejected.199 And the traditional justifications for Auer deference do not 
mirror those analyzed under Simplot’s Prong Four. Whereas the 
Simplot court identified reliance, practicality, legislative acquiescence, 
legislative contemporaneity, and agency expertise as the traditional 
justifications for deferring to agencies, Auer deference (or Seminole 
Rock deference) is mainly premised on political accountability and an 
agency’s superior competence in interpreting its own text.200 
Courts could resolve this inconsistency by analyzing different 
factors under Prong Four depending on whether the agency is inter–
preting a statute or a regulation. The Supreme Court directs courts to 
do as much in Kisor v. Wilkie. When analyzing whether to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a regulation under Auer and Seminole Rock, 
a court must first determine whether the regulation is “genuinely 
ambiguous.”201 Then the court determines whether the agency’s inter–
pretation is a reasonable construction of the regulation.202 Lastly, the 
court must inquire into whether “the character and context of the 
agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”203 Declining to 
prescribe an “exhaustive test” for this inquiry, the Kisor Court instead 
identified three analytic “markers”: (1) whether the agency’s 
interpretation is authoritative; (2) whether the interpretation 
implicates the agency’s expertise; and (3) whether the agency’s 
interpretation reflects its fair and considered judgment.204 
 
198. See, e.g., Mason v. Donnelly Club, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (Idaho 2001) 
(applying “free review” to determine whether two-weeks constitutes a 
“short time” under the Department of Labor’s regulation). 
199. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Idaho 
1991) (“While courts of some states continue to invoke the traditional 
rule giving great weight to the interpretations of agencies, they are 
equivocal in their application, leaving the impression that their 
administrative agency interpretations are entitled to judicial deference 
only when those interpretations are correct.”). 
200. See Manning, supra note 192, at 629–30; Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412–14. 
201. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414. 
202. Id. at 2415–16. 
203. Id. at 2416. 
204. Id. at 2416–18. 
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But applying different factors depending on whether the court is 
analyzing a statute or regulation could lead to inconsistencies in the 
frequency with which courts defer to regulations as opposed to statutes. 
Courts could end up deferring to agency interpretations of one or the 
other more often without any real justification for doing so. Although 
both Simplot and Auer incorporate a factor analysis, their underlying 
policy justifications are fundamentally different. Based on these 
differences, Auer and Simplot are irreconcilable, and the Supreme Court 
would have to overrule both Auer and Chevron if it chose to adopt 
Simplot’s four-prong test. 
C. National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services 
In National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand 
X Internet Services, the Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s prior 
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that 
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute, and 
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”205 The Court reasoned that 
when Congress implicitly delegates interpretive authority to an agency 
via statutory ambiguity, judicial precedent cannot override an agency’s 
interpretation.206 
Because Brand X applies to agency interpretations that are entitled 
to Chevron deference, federal courts could reformulate the rule so that 
it applies to agency interpretations entitled to deference under Simplot. 
Courts would continue to defer to an agency’s interpretation when it 
survives all four prongs. If the agency’s interpretation survives Prongs 
One through Three, Prong Four’s deference rationales allow the court 
to compare the agency’s interpretation to the court’s prior construction, 
providing the court with reasons to affirm the prior construction. If the 
judicial precedent is long-standing, then the court could argue that the 
reliance rationale is a compelling reason to refuse great-weight deference 
to the agency’s interpretation. The court could also argue that the 
legislative-acquiescence rationale supports the court’s interpretation; if 
Congress disagreed with the court’s interpretation, it would have 
clarified the ambiguity. Or, if the agency has employed specialized 
expertise in developing its interpretation, the court may decide that it 
makes sense to adopt the agency’s interpretation. Again, if the agency’s 
interpretation is more practical than the court’s, the court may choose 
to adopt the agency’s interpretation. In this sense, the court can 
exercise independent judicial review. Because the court would choose 
to adopt the agency’s interpretation, not necessarily defer to it, the 
agency would not override judicial precedent. 
 
205. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
206. Id. 
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It is possible, however, that overturning Chevron would necessitate 
the end of Brand X as well. Because Brand X is premised on the main 
principle of Chevron—the presumption that Congress delegates 
authority to agencies via statutory ambiguity207—rejecting Chevron 
could unmoor Brand X from this foundational principle. A court would 
once again have to decide whether its prior construction trumps the 
agency’s interpretation, which a court could hold under Simplot, as 
discussed above, or under de novo review.208 
IV. Improving the Test 
Although Idaho’s four-prong test has some advantages over 
Chevron, it does not completely cure the statutory-interpretation 
problems that arise out of Chevron Step One. While Idaho courts most 
commonly apply the four prongs in numerical order, 209  there are 
instances in which a court has addressed the prongs out of order or 
resolved the case on Prong Three alone.210 Asking whether the statute’s 
text answers the precise question at issue demands more precision than 
our language is capable of, and how the court approaches this question 
can significantly alter the outcome of the case. 211  Assessing the 
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation prior to determining 
whether the statute answers the precise question at issue limits the 
extent to which the court’s interpretive approach controls the outcome. 
Thus, if the Supreme Court is to adopt Idaho’s four-prong test, it should 
clarify that courts are to apply the four prongs in numerical order, and 
that they should refrain from resolving the issue on Prong Three 
without first analyzing Prong Two. 
As previously discussed, Chevron’s Step One and Simplot’s Prong 
Three ask the court to determine whether the statute’s text answers 
the precise question at issue.212 Under Chevron, agency constructions 
receive deference only when the court finds that the statute’s text does 
 
207. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1172. 
208. Whether applying the de novo standard to these constructions undermines 
the role of agencies is beyond the scope of this Note.  
209. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
210. See N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 376 P.3d 
722, 729 (Idaho 2016); Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 n.2 
(Idaho 2009). 
211. Compare Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 208 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho 2009) 
(finding the language of Idaho Code § 72-915 to be unambiguous), with 
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 21 P.3d 890, 894–895 (Idaho 2001) 
(finding ambiguity in the word “employment” in Idaho Code § 72-
212(9)). 
212. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
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not resolve the issue.213 But when a judge or Justice is more likely to 
find that the meaning of the statute “is apparent from its text,” she is 
less likely to defer to the agency’s construction.214 As Justice Scalia 
explained: “It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to 
accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not 
personally adopt.” 215  Justice Scalia attributed this result to his 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation.216 Critics of Chevron 
take issue with this outcome, arguing that Chevron ceases to be a rule 
at all if judges can circumvent its mandate by applying a strict 
constructionist approach.217 Justice Kavanaugh has also argued that 
whether a statute is ambiguous is an unanswerable question because 
judges will always disagree, and ambiguity inquiries open the door for 
judges to insert their own policy preferences.218 Furthermore, those who 
advocate for a purposivist interpretative approach object on the 
grounds that Chevron’s framework allows textualist judges to ignore a 
statute’s legislative history. 219  Under Simplot, when addressing the 
prongs in numerical order, the court asks under Prong Two whether 
the agency’s construction is reasonable before moving on to Prong 
Three.220 Thus, the court begins its analysis under Prong Three with a 
wider lens after having considered factors beyond the text of the 
statute.221 
The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamilton v. Reeder Flying 
Service222 exemplifies how the order of Prong Two and Prong Three 
controls the outcome of the case. At issue on appeal was whether the 
deceased claimant, a pilot employed by Reeder, qualified for workers’ 
 
213. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
214. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521 (1989). 
215. Id.; see also Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 
71 Vand. L. Rev. 1465 (2018) (noting that although “conservative panels 
are more likely to agree with conservative statutory interpretations and 
less likely to agree with liberal ones, and liberal panels are less likely to 
agree with conservative statutory interpretations and more likely to agree 
with liberal ones,” id. at 1495, “Chevron deference markedly curbs 
ideological behavior among reviewing circuit judges,” id. at 1502). 
216. Scalia, supra note 214, at 521. 
217. See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2140. 
218. Id. at 2135–39. 
219. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1392, 1423 (2017). 
220. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho 
1991). 
221. Cf. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 219, at 1423–24. 
222. 21 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2001). 
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compen–sation benefits. The relevant provision of the Idaho Code 
stated that employers are exempt from providing benefits if “the 
employer files with, and has written approval by, the industrial 
commission prior to employing a pilot.”223 To receive approval from the 
Industrial Commission, pilots had to apply each season for accident 
insurance, and they had to send evidence of that insurance to the 
Commission for approval. 224  While the deceased claimant received 
accident coverage before taking his first flight of the season, he did not 
receive approval from the Commission until thirteen days after his first 
flight.225 Reeder argued that it complied with the intent of the Idaho 
Code, and that the Commission had a twenty-seven-year-old custom 
according to which the exemption takes effect when the pilot submits 
his application for accident insurance along with his first premium 
payment.226 Reeder further argued that the Commission condoned this 
practice by consistently granting approval long after pilots began their 
flying season.227 At the administrative hearing, the Commission found 
that employers were exempt if the pilot had obtained accident insurance 
before the first flight of the season even if he or she had not yet received 
approval from the Commission. The claimant then appealed the 
Commission’s decision.228 
After finding under Prong One that the Industrial Commission had 
authority to administer the relevant statute, the court addressed Prong 
Two, whether the Commission’s interpretation was reasonable.229 The 
court began by stating “the application of a statute is an aid to 
construction when the public relies on the application over a long period 
of time,” and then looked to the Commission’s justifications for its 
interpretation. 230  First, because pilots would be covered by the 
necessary insurance before their first flights of the season even if they 
had not yet received Commission approval, the court found that the 
Commission’s interpretation satisfied the statute’s intent.231 Second, the 
Commission’s interpretation also minimized the expense incurred by 
employers because pilots would not have to wait for approval—
sometimes until the middle of the flying season—to begin flying.232 
 
223. Id. at 892. 
224. Id. at 891–92. 
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Lastly, the Commission made no objection to this practice for twenty-
seven years, giving employers the impression that the exemption was 
met as long as pilots obtained their insurance policies before their first 
flights.233 
The court then addressed the statute’s legislative history, finding 
that it supported the Commission’s interpretation. The statute’s state–
ment of purpose specified that it was intended to “exempt 
pilots . . . from the Workmen’s Compensation coverage provided they 
file with the Industrial Commission evidence of insurance coverage.”234 
The statute provided no specific procedure according to which pilots 
must meet the requirements. The Commission’s interpretation was also 
consistent with a recent amendment to the statute. Based upon the 
above findings, the court held that the Commission’s interpretation was 
reasonable, satisfying Prong Two.235 
Next, the court analyzed Prong Three, finding that the statute’s 
language did not expressly treat the question at issue because it was 
susceptible to more than one interpretation. The court held that the 
statute’s language could be interpreted as meaning either that the 
employer had to file proof of insurance before employing the pilot or 
that the employer had to file proof of insurance and obtain approval 
prior to employing the pilot.236 The Commission argued that the phrase 
“prior to employing” could be interpreted as meaning prior to 
employing a pilot to fly or prior to the pilot’s first flight of the season.237 
The court agreed with the Commission’s findings with respect to the 
term “employment.” Because the statute did not expressly address how 
one should construe the term employment, the Commission’s 
interpretation passed Prong Three.238 
The court then moved on to Prong Four, determining whether any 
of the traditional rationales justifying deference were present. The court 
concluded that the Commission’s interpretation represented a well-
established industry custom, and that interpreting workers’ compen–
sation statutes was the Commission’s area of expertise.239 These two 
rationales were sufficient to satisfy Prong Four, and the court deferred 
to the Commission’s interpretation.240 
If the court had addressed Prong Three before Prong Two, however, 




235. Id. at 893–94. 
236. Id. at 894. 
237. Id. at 894–95. 
238. Id. at 895. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
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the precise question at issue. In finding that the term “employment” 
was subject to more than one interpretation, the court considered that, 
for twenty-seven years, the Commission had consistently interpreted 
“employment” to mean the time during which a pilot is actually flying; 
whereas an ordinary reader of the statute may understand it to mean 
“the moment at which the employment contract is entered into.”241 If 
the court looked only at the language of the statute before considering 
whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, it could have 
concluded that “prior to employing a pilot” clearly meant prior to 
entering into an employment contract with the pilot, answering the 
precise question at issue. As is the case with Chevron, a textualist court 
could find that the statute’s language is clear, and thus deny the 
agency’s construction any deference based solely on Prong Three. If 
Idaho’s test is to replace Chevron and lead to more consistent results 
by eliminating a threshold ambiguity inquiry, courts must apply 
Simplot’s prongs in numerical order. 
Conclusion 
Four decades ago, the Supreme Court sought to simplify its analysis 
of agency interpretations, holding that deference to an agency’s 
statutory interpretation was no longer discretionary, but mandatory.242 
Today, critics challenge Chevron on multiple fronts, arguing that it 
violates Article III and that courts apply it so inconsistently that it 
ceases to be a coherent doctrine.243 And although Chevron may be a 
“mutation produced by the pressures of litigation,”244 agencies have 
become institutionalized as a significant component of our government. 
As Thomas Merrill recognizes, “[i]nstitutions are created, and become 
entrenched, in response to one set of imperatives . . . . By the time 
complications or objections come to the fore, the inertia of institutional 
change is too great to undo them.”245 Even if the Court rejects Chevron, 
it will still have to deal with an entire framework of administrative law. 
While some advocate for de novo review,246 agency deference does not 
have to be an all-or-nothing matter.247 Idaho’s four-prong test is a viable 
alternative, both eliminating Chevron’s threshold ambiguity inquiry 
and permitting the court to engage in a more searching judicial review. 
Where Chevron mandates deference, Idaho’s test permits courts to 
 
241. Id. 
242. Merrill, supra note 129, at 971. 
243. See Hamburger, supra note 6, at 1189; Merrill, supra note 129, at 980. 
244. Merrill, supra note 11, at 972. 
245. Id. at 997. 
246. See Hamburger, supra note 6, at 1249–50. 
247. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 1146; Merrill, supra note 129, at 969–71. 
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reject an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute when the 
traditional justifications for deference are absent. Idaho courts defer 
when it makes sense to do so, such as when an agency employs 
specialized expertise, which is also a long-standing rationale for 
deference in the federal courts.248 
Although the recent trend of state courts and legislatures 
abandoning deference for de novo review may suggest that federal 
courts should follow suit, some states exercise their independent 
judgment in the context of a Skidmore-like factor analysis, still 
considering various justifications for deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation. For example, Alaska courts employ two standards of 
review when analyzing an agency’s constructions of law.249 The first—a 
rational basis test according to which the court defers as long as the 
interpretation is reasonable—applies to agency interpretations that 
implicate an agency’s specialized expertise or fundamental policy 
decisions within the scope of the agency’s discretion.250 The second is 
an “independent judgment standard” under which the court interprets 
the statute de novo.251 Alaska courts employ this standard when the 
issue does not implicate the agency’s expertise.252 California follows 
Skidmore, looking to “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”253 And New Hampshire courts 
recognize that, while not controlling, an agency’s interpretation is 
persuasive when the legislature has entrusted the agency with the 
primary authority to interpret the statute.254 
While some still question the immediacy of Chevron’s impending 
demise,255 beyond Chevron lies a plethora of theoretical models, state 
doctrines, and legislative directives waiting to fill its void. Careful 
thought is due to which of these options most appropriately 
accommodates not only the Constitution’s separation of powers but the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative state. While Idaho 
may seem an unlikely source of legal innovation, its unique four-prong 
 
248. Merrill, supra note 129, at 973. 





253. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 22 P.3d 324, 335 (Cal. 
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test is aptly suited for the federal administrative landscape, and is a 
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